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M.B.'s passive acceptance of her stepfather's unprecedented solicitation. Even though statutory rape and incest cases do not require force on the part of the defendant or lack of consent on the part of the victim, a fact-finder is likely to believe that the "normal" fifteen year old in M.B.'s position would show some signs of shock, surprise or resistance. M.B.'s failure to do so, coupled with her subsequent avoidance of the police, would likely undermine her credibility with a jury.
Jurors scrutinizing such a narrative today would also deliberate in the current atmosphere of disillusionment regarding the credibility of child victims in sexual abuse cases. Despite the public's education and acceptance that sexual abuse is prevalent in family settings, 7 some writers have recently described a child abuse "hysteria." 8 Children, some say, will independently fabricate claims of sexual abuse to control, 9 to punish, 10 or to cover up their own promiscuity." Some psychoanalytic experts still argue that children fantasize, 12 and it has become increasingly accepted that parents can elicit from their children false allegations of sexual abuse where child custody is in dis-other times, beginning at age nine or ten, that this defendant had abused or tried to abuse her, did not appear in the indictment. 19 The times he threatened her with a knife to make her submit, and told her that her mother would put her in a facility if she sought help, all occurred prior to the charged incident. 20 Under the rules of evidence, each of these acts thus carried the designation of "uncharged crimes or bad acts." 21 In a state like New York, evidence of these acts would be inadmissible because New York strictly bans the admission of evidence of uncharged crimes in long-term incest or sexual abuse cases. 22 In such jurisdictions, a defense attorney can thus block jurors from hearing those components of a victim's narrative that place the charged acts in a context that would make the incongruous much more understandable.
New York's approach to uncharged crimes in long-term incest cases exists at a time when the rules in most other jurisdictions vary widely, but where most courts generally do allow juries to hear evidence of uncharged crimes in sex crimes cases, despite common-law and statutory prohibitions on presenting evidence of a defendant's bad character. 23 The roots of this permissiveness appear to stem from a belief that rapists and child molesters typically go unpunished due to "legal technicalities." 24 As a result, many-but not all-states have bent traditional common law prohibitions regarding uncharged crimes and admitted them in cases involving rape and child 19 Burke v. State, 624 P.2d 1240 , 1246 (Alaska 1980 . 20 Id. at 1247. 21 See infra note 23. 22 See People v. Lewis, 506 N.E.2d 915, 916-18 (N.Y. 1987) . A minority of states take a similarly strict position regarding the admissibility of uncharged crimes in cases of longterm sexual abuse. See, e.g., Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988); State v. Rickman, 876 S.W.2d 824 (Tenn. 1994) . Collectively, I refer to such jurisdictions as taking "the NewYork approach." 23 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) . Rule 404(b), which codifies the common-law view, states that:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident... Rule 404(b) or a common-law analog is in effect in all the states, including New York. See, e.g., People v. Molineux, 61 N.E. 286, 294 (N.Y. 1901 Recent federal enactments have injected even more uncertainty into the issue of the admissibility of uncharged crimes in sex crimes cases. On January 9, 1995, Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414 and 415 took effect, making a defendant's past history of rape or sexual abuse presumptively admissible in federal trials involving such charges. 2 6 In effect, the new federal rules reverse both the commonlaw prohibition on uncharged evidence of bad character, as well as FRE 404(b)'s statutory codification of that prohibition. 2 7 The new rules have prompted writings from scholars and practitioners who are concerned about the creation of special, and perhaps prejudicial, rules for sex crimes cases. 28 Legal challenge to the new rules on such grounds seems certain, and the outcome will be significant, not only within the federal system, but in any state that has adopted or is contemplating adoption of these rules.
29
25 A survey of other states' rationales for admitting uncharged crimes in these cases reveals a striking inconsistency of approach where many judges routinely stretch Rule 404(b)'s exceptions of "motive," "intent," and "plan" beyond what they were meant to encompass. For survey and general criticism of these various approaches, see EDWARD J. IM-WINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MscouNucr EVIDENCE § § 3: 08, 4:12, 4:13, 5:18 (1984) ; David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes"Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REv. 529, 541-44, 546-56 (1994) ; Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM.J. Crm. L. 127, 200-04 (1993) ;John E.B. Myers, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Child Abuse Litigation, 1988 UTAH L. RExv. 479, 503-07 (1988) . Other courts rely on the purported need to show a defendant's "lustftul disposition" toward his victim, a trait that veers quite close to propensity, and has been expressly overruled in New York. See People v. Lewis, 506 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1987) ; see also IM-WINKELRIED, § 4:11; Bryden & Park, supra, Myers, supra, Reed, supra, 26 FED. R. EVID. [413] [414] [415] . Since this article looks primarily at criminal cases of child molestation, Rule 414 is the most relevant of the statutory amendments. It states, in pertinent part, "(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant .... " 27 Karp, supra note 24, at 18. 28 See, e.g 883, 899-902 (1995) ; Mark A. Sheft, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier, 33 Am. CaRm. L. REv. 57, 76-87 (1995) . 29 With such challenge likely, it seems all the more appropriate to examine what could be considered FRE 414's polar opposite, the New York approach. For if FRE 414 is considered illegally permissive, the courts will have to consider where proper boundaries regarding the admissibility of uncharged crimes should lie. Such examination would show that New York's restrictive extreme is equally unwarranted, for the New York approach is not only doctrinally unsound, but also has devastating effects on an adolescent's ability to present a credible narrative in a case of long-term sexual abuse.
This article suggests that in a number of emotionally wrenching long-term incest cases 30 in New York, judicial roadblocks have unjustly stacked the deck against the traumatized adolescent complainant 31 who, in order to cope with continuing abuse, accommodates it to the point where she appears to be a willing participant. More specifically, the New York courts' overly broad interpretation of its evidentiary rule barring testimony regarding a defendant's uncharged crimes has prevented such a child victim from explaining for the jury how her distorted and otherwise inexplicably passive reactions to the charged sexual offenses were shaped by earlier uncharged sexual abuse at the abuser's hands. By shifting the jury's attention from the defendant's crimes to the victim's "unfathomable" behavior, the courts have made it extremely difficult for juries to perceive such victims as credible.
The 30 For purposes of this article I use the term "incest" to include notjust sexual relations between biological relatives, but also any repeated acts of abusive sexual conduct to which a perpetrator subjects a child with whom he has a familial, if not biological relationship. Thus, for purposes of this article stepfathers as well as paramours of biological relatives of the child can commit "incest." By "long-term," I refer to a pattern of sexual activity that begins in childhood and lasts many years, through the adolescence of the young victim. Finally, although it is certainly true that not all incest victims are female and all perpetrators male, the majority of such cases leads me to use gendered pronouns in this conventional way.
31 Setting adolescence as the time for disclosure and prosecution of long-term incest is not an arbitrary decision. In cases of long-term incest, children who voluntarily disclose often do so at an age where they would typically be striving for a measure of independence, such as adolescence. Perpetrators react to the adolescent's attempts to separate by becoming jealous and even more controlling, which can prompt a disclosure. CSAAS, supra note 11, at 186. Of course, many victims of incest or sexual abuse never disclose what they have been subjected to. 
1390
[Vol. 87 a jury may not hear testimony that a defendant previously committed similar crimes if the sole purpose for introducing such testimony is to instill the belief that defendant's past propensity makes him responsible for the presently charged crime. However, the New York courts also state that if a prosecutor convincingly shows some purpose, other than criminal propensity, to which the evidence is relevant, the uncharged crimes could be admitted so long as their probative value outweighs the possible prejudice to the defendant. 3 4 The rule and its possible exceptions thus become the battleground for prosecutor and defense counsel. In criminal cases generally, the specific permissible purposes delineated by the Molineux court-identity, motive, common scheme or plan, intent and knowledge 3 5 -have been treated as illustrative and not exclusive. 3 6 However, in sex crimes cases it is quite rare to see evidence of a defendant's history of sexual abuse admitted into evidence unless offered for one of these purp9ses. 3 7 Enabling a child to provide the context for her otherwise "incredible" behavior by reference to a defendant's earlier uncharged crimes is not one of the stated exceptions, and in fact has been expressly rejected by the Court of Appeals in New York. 38 However, in the last twenty years, rigid adherence to the Court of Appeals' narrow interpretation of the Molineux "exceptions" has had a high cost in the most severe cases of prolonged incest, because in such cases, it has been rare for prosecutors to be able to charge a defend- 41 pruned a large number of events from a potential indictment, particularly those that were more remote in time. If the surviving charged counts could clearly depict for a jury the forces that caused a child to apparently accept repugnant sexual acts, the child's credibility, and hence, the truth-telling process, may not have suffered. However, in the most severe of these cases, where abuse was ongoing for many years and where the child's emotional defenses were eviscerated well before the charged acts occurred, it was only by referring to the uncharged prior instances of abuse that a child could relate a narrative that established the psychological forces that enabled the defendant to successfully commit the charged crimes against her. PROC. § 30.10 (McKinney Supp. 1997) .
41 The State is required to articulate approximate dates that the alleged crimes occurred in order to charge a defendant with the offenses in an indictment. See N.Y. Grim. Proc. § 200.50 (McKinney 1993) . If a child complainant cannot give with "reasonable certainty" the date of an act, it cannot be the basis for a charge. See People v. Keindl, 502 N.E.2d 577, 579-80 (N.Y. 1986); People v. Morris, 461 N.E.2d 1256 , 1259 (N.Y. 1984 People v. Beauchamp, 532 N.Y.S.2d 111, 113 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) .
42 In 1996, New York's legislature enacted statutory reforms that tangentially assist a long-term incest victim in telling "the whole story," because they make more incidents of sexual abuse chargeable in an indictment. Thus the statute of limitations is now modified in cases involving child victims by commencing the five year limitations period on the child's eighteenth birthday, not the date of the crime itself. See N.Y. GRIM. PROc. § 30.10 (McKinney Supp. 1997 ). Additionally, a new felony offense was created called "course of sexual conduct against a child." This is a continuing crime in which specific dates need not be pleaded so long as the victim is less than eleven years old at the time that the defendant abuses the child. Id. at § § 130.75, 130.80 The purpose of these reforms, particularly the latter, is to permit more cases to be brought against molesters of young children.
See N.Y. SENATE COMM. ON CODES, MEMORANDUM ON S. REs. 5492(A). However, a side benefit of the legislation is that in some cases of long-term incest, a complainant will be able to testify to more acts, because the defendant may be charged with more crimes in the original indictment. However, the reforms do not render chargeable all abuse that a long-term incest victim may have suffered. Geographical limitations remain, as do specificity requirements for crimes committed after a child turns eleven years old. These weaknesses are not surprising where the beneficial effects were unintentional. By failing to confront the Court of Appeals' flawed reasoning regarding the inadmissibility of uncharged crimes in long-term incest cases, the law will continue to treat the victims of these crimes inconsistently and unequally; the clarity of a child's narrative and subsequent judgments as to her credibility In this article, I suggest that current precedent which bars an adolescent from testifying to uncharged acts that show the context within which she was abused, is an improper restriction of the Molineux standard. Continued adherence to this cramped interpretation of the law will cause some juries to hear fractured narratives of events from teenage victims. As a result, jurors are likely to find repeatedly victimized teenagers unbelievable and the charges against their abusers unfounded. This danger is, ironically, most imminent in the most severe cases of Accommodation Syndrome, 43 where the complainant is so emotionally broken by the early uncharged abuse that she appears to become an uncomplaining recipient of the often-horrifying charged offenses. 44 In such cases, if juries are to be able to search for the truth, it is imperative that the courts more fully recognize the ramifications of long-term incest as a continuing crime with a strong psychological component that connects one act to another, not a series of discrete and separate events. 45 More importantly, courts must begin to act on this knowledge in those cases where judges would present otherwise credible complainants as unfathomable, and hence unbelievable.
The case study that follows in Part II more specifically illustrates and explains the problem. Part III traces how the New York courts' undue restriction of the Molineux rules developed in long-term incest cases. Part IV examines research and theory regarding jurors' estimations of teenage complainants' credibility generally, and forecasts jurors' likely responses to hearing their fractured incest narratives. Finally, Part V proposes how courts can use knowledge of the Accommodation Syndrome as a guide to develop a uniform response to the admissibility of uncharged crimes. 
PEOpLE-

1997]
1393
LESLIE FE NER daughter, Anna B. 48 The Harris case graphically demonstrates how context, or the lack of it, can affect the perception of the credibility of the young complaining witness. Consider the narrative impact of the following decontextualized version of the complainant's testimony:
Anna was seventeen years old by the time she testified at trial. 49 She testified that one night between the first of October and Thanksgiving of 1984, when she was fifteen years old, her mother woke her up saying that "dad wants you. '50 She testified that she went downstairs after her mother into her mother and defendant's bedroom. She said that when she entered the room, her mother was naked, that her stepfather told her to take her own clothes off and that she did so unquestioningly. 5 1 He told her to get in bed with them, and she complied. 5 2 Anna then testified that defendant got "on top" of her mother, then got off her and got "on top" of Anna. 5 3 At that point, Anna said, defendant touched her body and had sexual intercourse with her. 54 Anna testified that defendant went back and forth between herself and her mother "until he was finished." '55 Throughout the incident neither Anna nor her mother protested, nor did defendant say anything. 5 6 When it was over, Anna said that she returned to her own room and bed.
57
After this act, Anna testified to a series of sexual acts that defendant perpetrated against her from December 1, 1984 to May of 1986.
8
She described the acts sparsely, using similar language for each incident, 59 so similar that the parties eventually stipulated that were she to 48 The name of the complainant in this case has been changed for purposes of this article. 49 See Transcript Record at 5, Harris (No. 3357/86) . In this respect Anna is demographically typical. In MacMurray's jurisdiction survey, 20% of cases referred to a prosecutor's office involved complainants over 13 years of age. Bruce K. MacMurray, CriminalDetermination for Child Sexual Abuse, 4 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 233, 239 (1989 During the time period that she said the abuse was occurring, Anna testified that occasionally her mother "would start complaining about it," but that Anna would 'just change the subject."
62 Finally, Anna testified that she became pregnant in February of 1986 by her stepfather and had an abortion in March. 63 These events, she said, led her to confide in a school guidance counselor in May of 1986, who notified the authorities. 64 I take the view that Anna's passive acceptance of the first act of rape is so counter-intuitive that it violates our operational notions of plausibility. 65 While a very young child might not be expected to question or resist an authority figure, the average person would inevitably find it difficult to accept a fifteen-year-old's unquestioning sexual intercourse with her stepfather and mother. Even absent any suggested motive on the child's part to fabricate, "logical" questions arise: Why didn't Anna question her mother's arrival in her bedroom? How could she take off her clothes and get into bed with her stepfather without protest? Why didn't she leave when her stepfather began sexual relations with her mother? Why didn't she resist the defendant when he got on top of her? Why didn't she seek help immediately after such a terrible event? How could the defendant presume that he could get away with such depravity and that Anna's mother would be such a willing participant?
In the courtroom, such questions are appropriate if the jury's task is to measure the credibility of a witness by the plausibility of the story.
6 6 Thus, even if the court instructed a jury that the victim's young age made any "consent" to these sex acts irrelevant to its delib- 207-08 (1988) . When such a value is ingrained in our "folk psychology," deviation from the value must be explaine. See JEROME BRUNER, A=rS OF MEANING 33, 49 (1990) 69 Because the abuse occurs in a private setting, the potential for finding witnesses is often nonexistent. See MacMurray, supra note 49, at 236. Further, because the victim's disclosure is usually quite delayed, little or no physical evidence is generally recovered. Id. This is quite true in Anna's case, where she alleged that defendant took polaroid photos of her naked and the two of them in an act of sodomy, but no pictures were recovered. See Transcript Record at 42-43, Harris (No. 3357/86); see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 91-92 (finding that in 53.2% of cases referred to prosecutors across eight jurisdictions, there was neither medical evidence nor eyewitnesses); Theodore P. Cross et al., Prosecution of Child SexualAbuse: Which Cases are Accepted? 18 CHiLD ABUSE AND NEGLECr No. 8, 663, 670 (1994) (finding that 55% of cases referred to prosecutors were based wholly on the complainant's testimony).
70 Confessions were found in approximately 32% of cases that prosecutors actually took to trial, according to Cross et al., supra note 69, at 666; Gray found that across eight jurisdictions prosecutors relied on defendant's statements in 37.2% of the cases they accepted for prosecution. GRAY, supra note 7, at 97.
71 Cross et al. found eyewitnesses in 15% of referred cases. Cross et al., supra note 69, at 666; Gray's survey found eyewitness testimony in 19% of referred cases. GRAY, supra note 7, at 91.
72 Gray found that 39% of cases referred for prosecution included no medical evidence and that another 35.2% of cases included evidence that was only suggestive of abuse. GRAY, supra note 7, at 91 & fig.4 .14. She suggests that the lack of such evidence may in part result from the uneven quality of medical examinations. Id. at 91.
73 New York, like most states has a "prompt outcry" exception to the hearsay rule that permits a witness to testify to the victim's initial disclosure of her sexual assault. See, e.g 
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INCEST &? CHILDREN NARRATIVES even more implausible. The competing story that the defense developed was that Anna was a disrespectful teenager who fabricated the charges, because she hated living at home, and because she was trying to cover up her own sexual activity with a boyfriend. 75 In support of that story the defense extensively cross-examined Anna. 76 In addition, the defendant's mother testified that Anna hated living at home and taking care of her siblings and admitted to having sex with her boyfriend a short time before her abortion. 77 The defendant's son also testified on defendant's behalf, claiming that Anna frequently paid -him so that she and her boyfriend could have sex in his bedroom. 78 The competing narrative is powerful because it draws upon negative stereotypes regarding teenagers. Indeed, the defendant's seventytwo year old 79 mother succinctly evoked the picture of the disrespectfial and rebellious teenager when she testified:
Q: How did [your relationship with Anna] change?
A: Because you know, prior to that she was such a beautiful child. She, er-she wasn't streetwise like, you know. But when she came to the house that day she was chewing gum and clicking it at me.
Q: Okay, and after that day you did not have such a nice relationship?
A-No. I said, oh, wow, has she changed.
Q:
Okay. And, you mean she changed by chewing gum or did she change in other ways?
75 The defense spent relatively little time trying to disprove Anna's allegations. On the acts themselves, Anna was cross-examined regarding the very young siblings that she testified slept through incidents of abuse that she suffered at the hands of defendant. See id. at 59-64, 102-06. She was also cross-examined regarding statements that she had previously made to the police and a child welfare worker. Id. at 68-72, 75-77. Finally, she was crossexamined regarding defendant's birth control practices or lack thereof. Id. at 85-87. Neither defendant nor her mother testified at the trial. Q: And you would just be there sitting and talking?
A: We were talking, kissing.
Q: Ever go any further than that?
A: No.
Q:
Did you ever go---did you ever go to bed with Paul in your brother's room? 
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A: No, just her overall appearance. She had all that makeup on and then to keep her hair down she had it glued down with grease, you know.
Q: I see.
A: And all this makeup on and, you know, the way she was talking and it just seemed streetwise, you know, that she had completely changed. And I told her father that.
0
The defendant's story is thus a proverbial story of put-upon parents and rebellious children, based upon existing stereotypes, that the defense took to an extreme. It is a story that is so familiar within society that it can easily be summarized in a sentence or two.
8 ' Further, because it does resonate so well with societal stereotypes, it sharpens the sense that Anna's "implausible" story cannot be true. However, before judging Anna's decontextualized story as flatly unbelievable, consider how one's view of Anna's description of the charged acts might change if she were permitted to put those events into the context of an escalating pattern of abuse that was initiated when Anna was five years old, and had by age fifteen rendered her passive and incapable of protest. In fact, defendant began by fondling Anna when she was five, by removing her clothing and touching her on her buttocks and in her vaginal area.
83 By the time she was eight, defendant was getting on top of her and trying to have intercourse, but Anna's cries kept him from actually penetrating her. 8 4 By age eleven, defendant succeeded in penetrating her vaginally and began placing his penis into her mouth and vagina on a regular basis.
85 By this time, Anna did not testify to any physical resistance on her part. During this uncharged time period, Anna did try to get help and failed. Defendant had told her never to tell anyone or he "was going 80 Id. at 191-92. 81 Proverbial stories or narratives are so familiar and so accepted within our culture that they allow us to simplify and to avoid attending to every detail of a given scenario. Peggy Cooper Davis, The Proverbial Woman, 48 R~c. Ass 'N B. CITn N.Y., 7, 11-12 (1993) . Such stories contrast sharply to those that would seem to violate cultural norms, and which thus require a more lengthy explanation to make them meaningful and acceptable to the listener. See BRUNER, supra note 65, at 47.
82
The simplicity of this stock story is reminiscent of the stock stories told as to why women accuse men of acquaintance rape or sexual harrassment. Such stories as "the woman scorned" or confused about her sexuality are similarly based on negative stereotypes and are so simple as to overpower a much more complex narrative from the woman victim. Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victim's Story, 2 TEx.J. WOMEN & L. 277, 290-91, 295-96, 299-300 (1993) 
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to do something" to her. 8 6 Despite the threat, she told her mother, whose response was to tell Anna that it was up to her to get defendant to stop. 8 7 She was eight years old at the time. 88 Over the subsequent years, Anna's mother also told her that disclosure would mean the breakup of the family. 8 9 After her mother failed to help her, Anna's stepfather dominated her completely. She kept the secret and became incapable of resisting defendant, physically or emotionally. 90 Does this context answer or shed light on the plausibility of Anna's narrative? The pattern of abuse that defendant subjected his stepdaughter to is consistent with the well-accepted clinical view of long-term molestation described by Roland Summit as the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome ("Accommodation Syndrome").91 This "syndrome" is actually a pattern of behaviors that depicts the phases of a long-term incest relationship based on clinicians' observations of sexually abused children. By briefly digressing to examine these phases or behaviors in closer detail, we can see just how early incest experiences shape and define the subsequent responses of a victim like Anna. The Accommodation Syndrome phases or behaviors-secrecy, helplessness, accommodation, disclosure and retraction 93 -typically occur in cases where the abuser, like Joachim Harris, is in a caretaking and apparently loving position with respect to the victim. 94 Such a perpetrator is in the best position to engage a child to accept sexual behavior. 95 Once the initial sexual activity occurs, that activity is characterized by secrecy, that is, the victimizer conveys to the child that she is not to tell anyone of the abuse. 
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secrecy, because the child does not understand the reality of the experience; she is dependent on the perpetrator for whatever reality he assigns to it. When he tells her that the act must be kept secret, the inference that the child draws is that she has done something bad or dangerous that she cannot reveal. Consequently, while some perpetrators secure secrecy by means of intimidation, threats of violence are usually unnecessary. The perpetrator can use the child's shame and fears of abandonment to maintain secrecy.
96
Keeping the secret causes the child to react with helplessness to additional acts of sexual abuse. While children may make some attempt to avoid sexual activity (for example, by feigning sleep at night), children do not naturally or normally resist perpetrators who they depend upon for love or family security. Minimal acts of avoidance are easily overcome because of the perpetrator's constant access.
97
Since the child cannot tell, cannot resist, and cannot avoid, she responds by accommodating to the abuse, that is, by becoming passive and seemingly accepting of the abuse. Accommodation allows a child like Anna to accept the abuse and survive. She comes to believe that she is responsible for what is happening to her, and that she must keep her family intact by cooperating with her abuser. While the child's passivity allows her to survive emotionally, it also permits and encourages the perpetrator to escalate his sexual demands without fear of disclosure.
98 Thus, Joachim Harris had little to fear from Anna when he involved her in his sexual activity with her mother.
The pattern of abuse and accommodation ends where there is disclosure, 9 9 which will usually be followed by pressure to retract or suppress the outcry 0 0 of sexual abuse. 1 0 1 This pressure emanates from other family members who cannot accept that the perpetrator could commit these acts, cannot cope with the breakup of the family that disclosure generally requires, or cannot bear the stigma they feel that outsiders will attach to them. Those who cannot pressure the child into recanting may instead attempt to undermine the child's 96 CSAAS, supra note 11, at 181; Goodwin, supra note 12, at 22. 97 CSAAS, supra note 11, at 183. That the Accommodation Syndrome has a clinical label and widespread clinical support' 0 4 should not shroud its logical core from the layperson. Indeed, to consider the Accommodation phases within the specific example of Anna's experience, the early events in Anna's life should make the illogic of the charged events more understandable, even to a layperson. One can instinctively envision that a child subjected ata very young age to gradually escalating acts of abuse would come to accept that as her reality and be less likely to resist over time. One can consider that conclusion even more foregone if the person this child has confided in, her mother, the person who should be most protective of the child, has utterly betrayed her. Perhaps the only remaining question is why the child would ever make any disclosure under such circumstances.
To prevent the jury from hearing this "whole story" would seem as unfair to the truth-finding process as would denying the defendant the opportunity to fully respond to the charges. Yet, despite the significance of the evidence of earlier abuse to understanding Anna's passivity and defendant's emboldened behavior, jurisdictional and notice requirements prevented the State from charging defendant with these acts in the indictment. Many acts occurred before the five year statute of limitations then in effect, 0 5 many occurred in California and Queens, New York, 10 6 not Brooklyn, and many occurred when Anna was between ages twelve and fifteen, but she could not date them with any reasonable specificity. 10 7 Because these events could not be charged, this conduct took on the legal designation of "uncharged crimes" and became subject to strict judicial scrutiny before admission of Anna's testimony regarding those acts could be considered. 108 Thus, in a pretrial conference, the State moved to permit Anna to testify regarding these uncharged crimes, in order to provide necessary context for the charged offenses. 10 9 The prosecutor argued to the court that the testimony of years of escalating sexual abuse prior to the charged events was essential to the "continuity of the case, and to an understanding of the victim's conduct." 1 1 0 That the deviant conduct began so early in Anna's life helped explain her attitude and behavior regarding the defendant's offenses, including her failure to disclose the defendant's abuse to anyone prior to 1986.111 In opposing the motion, the defense argued that the evidence was inflammatory and irrelevant to the charged offenses.
112
The trial court ruled that Anna would be permitted to testify regarding the uncharged offenses. The court found that the testimony was "necessary" in order to give "fabric and texture to the entire case."' 13 Thus, as the trial proceeded, Anna was able to describe chronologically how the abuse began and how it escalated. The jury was able to understand Anna's growing accommodation to the abuse and her resulting passivity. The charged offenses were thus placed in a context that did not seem wholly incredible.
The jury convicted the defendant of multiple counts of statutory rape and sodomy. On appeal, however, the appellate court reversed, finding that the admission of defendant's uncharged crimes was improper. 114 In its decision, the appellate court made no effort to compare the charged and uncharged offenses to see if the latter shed necessary light on the former. Instead, the court characterized the uncharged offenses as "merely cumulative, and was not offered to prove an element of the crimes charged." 115 The appellate court's sketchy analysis of the facts was somewhat predictable, because higher authority in New York had previously spoken directly to the issue in an equally abbreviated way. In People v. Lewis, 116 the Court of Appeals reversed a trial judge's decision to permit a fourteen-year-old girl to testify to her father's ten uncharged acts of rape to explain why she didn't resist her father throughout the one charged offense. 117 The Court of Appeals held that such testimony would improperly buttress, bolster or credit the complainant, instead of provide necessary context."I 8 In turn, the Harris court relied on the Lewis decision when it stated that "enhancement of the complaining witness's credibility [is not] one of the recognized exceptions to the Moli- By placing the uncharged acts within the paradigm of "buttressing"' 20 or "enhancing"' 121 credibility, the Harris court maintained the legal fiction that long-term incest is a series of discrete and independent acts. 122 Viewed in such a fashion, the Harris decision is logical-if uncharged act A does not shed light on charged act B, then act A serves no purpose, except to bolster the complainant and prejudice the defendant. 123 However, by relegating the uncharged facts to the "bolstering" paradigm without discussing them in any detail, the court itself altered Anna's narrative. 124 Decontextualized, Anna's testimony is incongruous; that artificial incongruity gives the defendant a significant advantage in presenting his stock story of teenage rebellion. On the other hand, had the court laid out the facts behind the charged and uncharged crimes, it would have been difficult to say that the progression of events over time served no purpose except to improperly credit the complainant. To the contrary, the contextualized narrative allowed both complainant's and defendant's stories to be carefully scrutinized using traditional tests of credibility.
The Harris result is not an isolated one. Since the Court of Appeals decided People v. Lewis, numerous courts have mechanically excluded evidence of prior sexual contact that a defendant has perpetrated against a child victim without considering whether the exclusion is doctrinally sound. 125 In addition to these cases, prosecutors have no doubt declined to pursue numerous others, because a complainant's description of the charged counts under Lewis would sound incredible. It is, therefore, well worth reviewing the doctrinal underpinnings of Lewis, to determine whether new consideration of the subject of uncharged crimes is appropriate. The admissibility of uncharged crimes in cases of long-term sexual abuse has see-sawed wildly since 1901, when the New York Court of Appeals set out its rules for the admissibility of uncharged crimes in criminal cases. 12 6 In Molineux, the Court of Appeals followed the common law view that convicting a defendant based on his or her propensity to commit past crimes was repugnant. 127 However, at the same time, the court recognized that evidence of past crimes could, at times, establish something other than mere propensity. The now-famous exceptions listed in the decision-identity, motive, common scheme or plan, intent and knowledge-are examples of legitimate purposes for which uncharged crimes may be admitted. 128 The exceptions have become so ingrained that any criminal law practitioner can rattle them off with ease. Yet the Molineux court itself stated that the exceptions to the rule could not "be stated with categorical precision, ' 129 and subsequent courts have considered the exceptions to be illustrative, not exclusive. 13 0 In the years since the Molineux decision, New York courts have moved beyond these illustrative exceptions and admitted uncharged crimes where those acts provided necessary context and background to the narrative of the charged offenses.' 3 ' For example, in People v. Ricotta, 13 2 where the defendant was accused of acting in concert with another to start a fire in his family's building, the court deemed defendant's uncharged prior arson of his family's previous residence, "inextricably interwoven into the transaction forming the basis of the charge ... and completed the narrative of the episode.' 3 3 In People v. Tabora,' 34 an undercover police officer was permitted to testify not only to the drug sale that constituted the charged offense against a defendant, but also to defendant's prior sale of drugs to him, in order to complete the narrative as to how the charged transaction came where defendant was on trial for murder, witnesses were permitted to testify to defendant's many uncharged crimes as leader of their gang. The court found that the uncharged crimes were necessary to explain to the jury the unique relationship between defendant and the witnesses, who were by virtue of their common gang membership, privy to defendant's activities relevant to the charged crimes.' 3 9 The common thread to each of these decisions appears to be ajudgment that barring testimony regarding the uncharged offenses would render the witness's testimony subject to doubts that would not occur if the testimony was placed in proper context. In relatively recent cases, the courts have utilized the context exception to admit past bad acts that a defendant has committed against a witness which have had the effect of emotionally warping the witness to such a degree that the witness's behavior would seem incredible without the contextual background. For example, in People v. LeGrand, 140 defendant, a cult leader, was accused of murdering two women during a party for the sixty-odd members of his "church.' 4 '
One cult member, who acted as "guard" while the murders were being committed, testified on behalf of the prosecution, while another member of the cult confessed in open court to having committed the murders himself. 142 The trial court deemed it appropriate for the prosecution to prove by way of defendant's prior bad acts, the total domination and control that he had over members of his cult. 14 3 The trial court found, and the appellate court agreed, that it was only by way of these acts that ajury could understand whether these witnesses acted freely, both on the night of the murder and at the trial itself. More generally, the court found the acts necessary to explain why the defendant would not hesitate to murder in front of sixty potential witnesses.' 44 In LeGrand, the uncharged acts so affected the witnesses that without the benefit of this context information, it is likely that the In Steinberg, the defendant was accused of killing his six year-old adopted daughter. Defendant's common-law wife testified at the trial that she saw the defendant carry the unconscious child out of the bedroom and lay her on the floor, and that he told the witness that he would take care of the child when he returned. 46 The witness further testified that she took no steps to aid the child while the defendant was away, but felt compelled to obey his instructions.1 47 It was that feeling of compulsion that the court found required explanation, and to that end, it was necessary for the witness to explain that defendant had physically abused the witness for years, so severely that she lacked the free will to take any steps on behalf of her child.1 4 8 Without this contextual information, the court held, the witness's testimony would seem "patently incredible." 49 In holding that the uncharged assaults were admissible, the court relied on the "ample case law" supporting the proposition that uncharged crime evidence may be used to support testimony that otherwise might be unbelievable or suspect.
150
In a general sense, the LeGrand and Steinberg courts validated the proposition that "acts" do not have real meaning unless they are considered in their contextual setting, within the mutually interacting states of the participants. 5 1 More specifically, these decisions demonstrate that the context principle for admissibility of bad acts can include acts that emotionally warp and desensitize individuals who continue to interact with each other over time. As the victimizer's acts traumatize the victim, the victim exhibits aberrant behavior. By the time the charged acts occur, the victim's behavior is so abnormal that without explanation, a jury is likely to reject it out of hand. 52 
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[Vol. 87 parallels with a case like Anna B.'s seem immediately apparent. 153 However, while the context/narrative exception as applied to cases outside the realm of intrafamiial sexual abuse has developed in a consistent way, the rules applied to this subset of cases have been much more inconsistent. The inconsistency does not stem from an initial misapplication of Molineux itself. Instead, it originates in the separate rules regarding sex crimes that have waxed and waned as Molineux has progressed, rules that have tracked society's changing views of women and children over the years.
While Molineux principles descended to American jurisprudence by way of the British courts, the early English courts did not prosecute offenses such as incest, fornication and adultery in the criminal courts.' 5 4 Such matters were handled by ecclesiastical courts, which operated on the principle that these offenses related to status, that is to what the parties were, not what they had done, and were subject to proof by evidence of specific instances of sexual activity. 155 In such cases, proof of specific acts between the parties was deemed relevant to show their "lustful disposition," and thus to prove their illicit Status. Because these courts had no jurisdiction in the American colonies, some of the colonies enacted statutes criminalizing incest, fornication and adultery.' 57 However, it was not until the latter part of the 19th century that the women's rights movement began to lobby for enforcement of statutes to protect both women and children. 158 By that time, a dichotomy existed among those in authority 59 regarding child victims of sexual abuse. On the one hand, there was an outcry to protect women and children, who were viewed as virginal creatures who could easily be defiled by men, which led to stepped up enforcement of incest and statutory rape laws. 160 153 Scheppele suggests that placing the legal event itself, "the trouble," into context instead of confining the story to the event, is an approach in legal storytelling that tends to make "outsiders" more comprehensible to a legal audience. Kim Lane Scheppele, Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 REv. , 2097 REv. (1989 . To the extent that the law can begin to empower the outsider, the context/narrative exception is an evidentiary device that can be utilized for that purpose. In 1914, The NewYork Court of Appeals appeared to resolve the inconsistency with Molineux by overtly validating, in prosecutions for adultery, seduction, statutory rape and incest, an uncharged crime exception, where the uncharged crime consisted of other sexual conduct between the defendant and complainant. 1 6 4 In People v. Thompson, a statutory rape case, the court approved the admission of the uncharged acts, because the conduct showed "the existence of a sexual passion between [the parties'] as elements in proving that they had illicit connection . . . on the dates charged."
165 While "passion"
would seem interchangeable with "propensity," the court distanced the Thompson ruling from the prohibitions of Molineux in two respects: First, it deemed the uncharged acts "corroborative" of the charged crimes, 166 instead of demonstrative of defendant's propensity to commit the charged crimes. Second, by continuing to ascribe to the victim the same "passion" or "mutual disposition" 16 7 as the defendant, the court seemingly distanced its exception from the emphasis on the defendant's character that Molineux condemned. However, while post-Thompson courts followed the rule of law set down in the case, the underpinnings distinguishing it from Molineux's prohibition on proving bad character began to crumble. In the 1960s and 19 7 0s, clinicians began to publicize their conclusions that victims of statutory rape and incest were unlikely to share a "passion" for their abusers. 68 Ironically, it is this more appropriate way of viewing the child victim that seemed to underscore the Lewis decision in 1987,175 which banned the admission of a defendant's uncharged sexual abuse of his victim in cases of statutory rape. Once "mutuality" disappeared, the Court of Appeals was left with the defendant's "amorous design," a phrase that no longer seemed so different from propensity; admitting uncharged sexual offenses for reasons of propensity seemed flatly violative of the Molineux rule. Indeed, the Lewis court held as much, concluding that "amorous design" could only be a legitimate exception to the Molineux rule when both the victim's and defendant's "amorous designs" were relevant to the charge. 176 Because a victim's consent is irrelevant in a case of statutory rape, the court stated, the uncharged prior crimes are also irrelevant.
7
Nor did Thompson's language of "corroboration" hold sway with the Lewis court. It found that corroboration of the victim's testimony was not necessary, since the legislature had removed corroboration requirements for child victims who were deemed competent to testify.1 78 Even if it was required, the court did not find "the unsubstantiated accusations" of the child victim regarding uncharged crimes to be corroborative of the charged events. While abolishing "amorous design" or "lustful disposition" as an exception to the prohibition on uncharged crimes may have been logically appropriate under Molineux, the Lewis court effectively preempted consideration of the admissibility of these uncharged crimes pursuant to the developing context exception followed in Gines and Ricotta. 180 Indeed, the court made no attempt to determine whether or not the uncharged crimes could still be admissible pursuant to any Molineux exception, and the absolute language of the decision has prevented any court since Lewis from making that inquiry. Each case decided after Lewis has summarily reversed statutory rape convictions, even where uncharged crimes did establish the same kind of context considered admissible in Steinberg and LeGrand. 8 1 The closest that the courts have come to reconsidering uncharged crimes in incest cases in light of the context exception oc- 175 See People v. Lewis, 506 N.E.2d 915, 918 (N.Y. 1987) . [Vol. 87 1410 curred in the dissenting opinion in People v. Singh.' 8 2 The majority opinion in Singh, like Harris, is notable for its dearth of information regarding the facts of the case. Beyond listing the charges, 183 the majority omitted any description at all of the kinds of acts defendant was charged with committing against his daughter, as well as any description of the five years worth of earlier uncharged crimes. As in Harris, such omissions enabled the court to apply the Lewis rule summarily without considering whether or not a context exception might apply.
The dissent pointed out the flaws in such a summary approach, emphasizing that when the nineteen-year-old complainant testified, she related a pattern of abuse that began many years before.' 8 4
Through her testimony regarding the early uncharged offenses, the complainant established the dynamics of her relationship with the defendant, explaining both how these crimes continued to be committed against her and why she did not act to protect herself at an earlier date. 8 5 The dissent quoted the complainant's testimony to explain her failure to outcry until so many years had passed. The abuse:
... started when I was a very little girl, and he led me to believe that I was supposed to be doing this. And, if I ever did state to him that I thought I shouldn't be doing this, he said that I was supposed to, he would fulfill all my needs. Once again, he made me feel very guilty, that I wasn't good enough for him, that I wasn't good enough, period.'
The dissent concluded that testimony like this about the uncharged offenses was necessary to truly show the defendant's dominance over the complainant, to explain her failure to outcry and to show how the crimes charged in the indictment were alleged to have actually been committed. To give this conclusion legal viability, the dissent relied on the context/narrative exception followed in other cases.' 8 7 The dissent did not ignore Lewis, but it framed the case as precedent that abolished the "amorous design" exception in New York, not as precedent that precluded consideration of uncharged crimes under any other Molineux exception. while established before Lewis was decided, has become more accepted and relied upon in more recent years. To note this may explain in part the judicial blinders of the Lewis court. On the other hand, the drastic implications of Lewis for the credibility of a traumatized incest survivor makes reconsideration of the context exception both timely and appropriate.
IV. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF LE-yS ON INCEST VICTIMS' PERCEIVED CREDIBILITY
The intuitive "that's not fair" that a prosecutor would inevitably cry at the result in Harris could be more easily dismissed as partisan grumbling, if the rule's deleterious effects on adolescent complainants' credibility were not so well supported by social science research into jury decision-making. Such research leads to the conclusion that a truncated narrative that does not comport with jurors' expectations or experiences is likely to be rejected out of hand. Jurors are likely to find witnesses putting forward these abbreviated narratives to be incredible.
Pennington and Hastie's important work on jury decision making' 89 gives strong support for the principle that jurors organize the information they receive in a trial by imposing a story-type structure on that information. Such processing means that information that may come in bits and pieces from different witnesses, documents or physical evidence will be translated by jurors into a narrative, that is, a series of events or episodes that begins, peaks and resolves. 190 This encoding is more than mere process. Imposing a story structure on information is a comprehension strategy for understanding and assessing human action. 9 1 Once the juror assembles the story, he or she is able to compare it with knowledge that the juror has already encoded throughout his or her life.
2
The "fit" of the trial story with the stories embedded in the per-189 Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model, 13 CAruozo L. REv. 519 (1992 
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[Vol. 87 sona of each juror is of critical importance in determining the outcome of a trial. 193 Not only do jurors examine trial stories for comprehensiveness and coherence, but they seek to match them with the stories and experiences of their own lives. Specific world knowledge about events similar to those in dispute will determine whether a particular interpretation is accepted or rejected.
194
Pennington and Hastie's conclusions regarding the power and inevitability of story formation comports with the views of other scholars, social scientists and practitioners. 195 Thus, advocates attempt to weave evidence into a consistent story that is likely to mesh with jurors' own assessments of what is coherent and what comprehensively explains the evidence.' 96 The simpler the story can be, that is, the less it deviates from the societal norm and requires explanation, the more likely it is to resonate with jurors' experiences and be accepted.'
The difficulty arises when evidence is not comprehensive enough to fall into a familiar narrative form. Where jurors perceive "gaps" in the storyline, they must return to their own worlds and "fill in" the trial narrative with inferred events which may have nothing to do with trial evidence. 198 Indeed, litigators exploit perceived gaps in their opponents' stories, by urging jurors to fill in these gaps with the juror's own fixed views of the world. 199 To the extent that the juror's world view is shaped by experiences, stereotypes or beliefs that contradict the narrative being offered, the tactic is likely to be successful. 199 Sherwin, supra note 195, at 689. 200 Amsterdam and Hertz provide one example of this tactic in their analysis of a closing argument to a jury in a murder trial, where the sole issue was whether the defendant had the state of mind that made him guilty of murder (intent to kill) or manslaughter (recklessness). In that case, the defense was able to put forward to the jury its own narrative, in part by pointing out that the prosecutor's evidence of intent was ambiguous and far different from the stereotypical cold-blooded killer who kills for an identifiable motive, takes purposeful aim and punctuates the killing with a dramatic remark. In offering this portrait of an intentional killing, the defense substituted a stock story familiar through the popular
1997]
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Is an acquittal under such circumstances "wrong" or "unjust?" I would suggest that where the "gap" results from a natural deficiency in the evidence it is neither. For example, a defense attorney tells jurors that a certain defendant, during a physical fight, killed a victim in self-defense. If the defendant has no apparent injuries or marks that would support the notion of a struggle, it is completely appropriate for jurors to rely on their own knowledge of brawling to decide whether or not such a scenario makes logical sense. Indeed, judges constantly instruct jurors to rely on their own experiences and knowledge in deciding whether or not a story is credible. However, if a rule of evidence excludes existing evidence that is an integral part of the storyline, the jury's dismissal of the narrative and subsequent acquittal of a defendant is less satisfactory. It is true that the rules of evidence are framed to avoid this result: Evidence is presumed admissible unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. 20 2 If the gap-filling evidence would be considered probative, the presumption weighs toward admission, unless a defendant demonstrates overriding prejudice. 20 3 There are many specific examples of rules of evidence that, when considered within the paradigm of narrative or storyline, do preserve a story's integrity. For example, certain kinds of hearsay must be excluded from evidence, but such hearsay is admissible where it is necessary to explain a witness's state of mind and subsequent actions, 20 4 something that would be considered integral to a narrative line. Similarly, lay witnesses may not give opinions thatjurors could reach themselves, and which, thus, would not be necessary to advance a narrative, but expert opinions are admissible when such opinions will give the jury the specialized knowledge that will allow it to interpret the "facts" of a case. 2 0 5 So too, in virtually all criminal cases, the courts bar evimedia, for the ambiguities in the prosecutor's case. Amsterdam & Hertz, supra note 193, at 59, 201 See 1 CRIMINALJURY INSTRUCTIONS, NEw YoRK, supra note 6, § 7.02 (stating "[e]ach of you brings to this jury all the experience acquired in your private life. In your everyday affairs you make ajudgment on the reliability or unreliability of statements made to you by others. The same tests which you apply in your everyday dealings should apply in your deliberations as jurors."). While helpful to ajury, such consistency is likely to be presumed until attacked, and hence, not integral to a storyline. Yet in sex crimes cases, the same courts permit testimony as to a victim's prompt outcry that she has been raped or sexually abused because "it is natural to expect that the outraged female will make prompt disclosure to a person upon whom she might rely." 20 7 The report thus becomes a part of the story itself.
2 0 8
In contrast with the preceding examples, where the probative/ prejudice balance still preserves a narrative storyline, the wholesale preclusion of early sexual behavior between defendant and complainant in long-term incest cases has such a devastating effect on narrative formation that jurors are denied the ability to render a just verdict based on the evidence. In fact, long-term incest cases uniquely require narrative development, and truncating such development can consistently render this kind of case unbelievable and unprovable.
A. THE NATURE OF THE LONG-TERM INCEST CASE
Not all criminal cases require a prolonged storyline structure for the crime itself to be understood by ajury. In many cases, the story of a crime is not in dispute, only the identity of the perpetrator. For example, where an intruder burglarizes a home in the middle of the night, assaults the victim, steals money and is apprehended days later, the defendant may not choose at trial to contest the fact of the burglary itself. Instead, the defense could attack the prosecution's contention that this defendant committed what is conceded is a crime. Narratives would undoubtedly be told throughout the course of this burglary trial, but there is little possibility that they would center on proof of or attack on the prosecution's claim that the victim was burglarized. 2 0 9 So too, in deliberations the jury would be unlikely to debate the story of the crime itself; that story would be accepted as given.
LESLIE MATER
However, in long-term incest cases, there is no defense of mistaken identity. Jurors are called upon to decide whether the prosecution's narrative of the crimes themselves could have, in fact, occurred. This, in turn requires an assessment of the description of the charged events. Lawyers will argue over, and jurors will scrutinize, particular components of the story, such as whether or not others who lived in the home should have been aware; whether the victim could have acquired her knowledge of sexual acts in another way; whether her reasons for keeping the incest secret sound plausible. Once the jury's attention is focused on the story of the crimes as presented by the prosecution, the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires that the story be comprehensive and coherent. 2 1 1 To the extent that necessary contextual information is omitted, the narrative becomes less comprehensive, less coherent and less credible. 
THE TELLER OF THE TALE AND THE INCEST DYNAMIC
While technically it is always the prosecution's burden to present the story of the crime, the one-witness nature of long-term incest cases places the storytelling burden squarely on the shoulders of the adolescent complainant-victim. In this respect too, long-term sexual abuse differs from other kinds of crimes, which may take place in front of witnesses or produce physical evidence. 2 1 3 In these cases, where the jury hears a largely uncorroborated storyline, a double burden exists: both the story and the teller must comport with the expectations a jury would have about both sexual abuse and the victims of sexual abuse. 2 14 Because such victims are so often subject to attack on their identity of the perpetrator, story creation analysis may not be descriptive of the way jurors process information. Pennington & Hastie, The Story Mode4 supra note 189, at 551. On the other hand, where the decision in a criminal case rises and falls based on the credibility of witnesses, jurors will frequently tell themselves stories, invoking assumptions that correspond with their cultural communities. See Cammack, supra note 195, at 479.
211 In this regard, long-term sexual abuse is not unique. Virtually any kind of criminal charge can support a "what happened" defense. However, long-term incest cases are never "who did it cases," and always involve a determination of the child's credibility in making her accusations. 212 Bruner states that for narrative to resolve deviation from the norm in a comprehensible fashion, the teller must be able to relate a narrative not just sentence by sentence or event by event, but within whatever cultural framework is necessary to allow the teller to share her interpretation of the events with the listener. See BRUNER, supra note 65, at 64. 213 See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. See also Myers et al., supra note 18, at 37-45. 214 Child victims of long-term sexual abuse are similar, in this regard, to adult victims of rape or sexual harrassment. For further exploration of the "he said-she said" nature of these cases, see Scheppele, supra note 82. For discussion as to how the law diminishes "non-traditional" acquaintance rape victims, see Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986).
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character, temperament and honesty, it becomes even more important for the young victim to testify comprehensively-to fully explain the pattern of abuse the defendant has subjected her to.
215
Teenage girls are particularly vulnerable to negative judgments regarding their credibility. In simulated sexual abuse trials where only the age of the victim was manipulated, researchers found that jurors tended to find girls over twelve years of age to be significantly less credible than adolescent girls under the age of twelve. 2 16 As researchers polled theirjurors, they found that as victims entered adolescence, jurors perceived them as partly responsible for the abuse they were subjected to, and that belief correlated with a decrease in their perceived credibility. 2 17 This correlation held with a significant number ofjurors, even when consent was not an issue at trial, and the jurors were specifically instructed to that effect.
218
In this respect, the skepticism people demonstrate toward teenage sexual abuse victims is similar to the skepticism that greets adult victims of acquaintance rape. 219 However, even if adult women face serious obstacles in pressing claims of rape, teenage incest victims face even more. For in the case of a defendant accused of raping an adult woman, consent is a defense and it is within the jury's purview to consider evidence of the victim's consent. 220 In long-term incest cases, which are brought primarily under statutory rape provisions, and where jurors are specifically instructed that "consent" of the victim is irrelevant, attributions of responsibility to the victim are inappropriate.
The incest dynamic itself can also affect the credibility of the trau-215 Lempert suggests that when juries are unaware of the stories that can plausibly explain witness testimony, ajury is unlikely to merely defer to the witness, and more likely to disregard the testimony. Lempert, supra note 195, at 
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matized teenage storyteller, because such victims do not tend to testify in ways that jurors would typically expect. Just as victims of long-term abuse tend to become more passive over time with their abusers, so too can they withdraw from others; they are plagued by low self-esteem, and their communication and social skills are often weak. 2 21 Jurors who expect an incest survivor to relate a narrative in an expressive, direct and tearful way are likely to be disappointed. On the contrary, it is entirely likely to see such a witness testify flatly, without emotion, tears or even eye contact.
2 22 While some prosecutors might elect to call expert witnesses to try to educate the jury as to the link between trauma and demeanor, 223 such experts might be of limited use with ajury pool that has educated itself by way of "L.A. Law" and the sexual abuse TV movie of the week.
224
Finally, severe trauma from long-term molestation can also cause a victim to recant her allegations prior to trial. Recantations can occur as a result of pressure applied to a young victim by other family members, but they can also arise from the traumatized victim's own desire after her outcry, to preserve the family unit. 225 Assuming that the victim regains the strength to pursue her initial complaint, the fact of her recantation becomes one more incongruity that is difficult to explain without reference to the entire pattern of the sexual acts. Underlying all these obstacles facing the adolescent complainant are the stock stories or negative stereotypes that consistently portray teenage girls in a negative light. Indeed, media and popular culture consistently portray adolescent girls as conniving, would-be seductresses of unwary men. 226 The few actual cases where the evidence 221 See Sgroi et al., supra note 95, Gray's trial observers found that in one-third of the observed trials involving children of all ages and sexual abuse of varying degree and length, children described the abuse flatly, that in a significant number of trials observed, the victims avoided any kind of eye contact, and that children broke down and cried in only 14% of observed cases. GRAY, supra note 7, at 156. In the more severe and long-term cases of sexual abuse, these passive reactions could be even more prevalent.
223 In order for such expert testimony to be placed before the jury in a state like New York, the trial court would have to rule that a victim's flat demeanor is explained by Accommodation Syndrome and that jurors would not normally expect this demeanor from one who has been repeatedly sexually abused. See People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 135-36 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Keindl, 502 N.E.2d 574, 583 (N.Y. 1986 144-46 (1989) , for a description of the sexually promiscuous teenaged girls and helpless older men that populate the "high school genre" in film. Reed also notes the presence of the "vicious girl clique" that plots against the innocent protagonist(s). Id. at 155.
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suggests that adults were wrongfully accused of molestation, primarily in the daycare area, receive so much publicity that it is easy to expand upon them to negatively generalize about children and adolescents.
22 7 That people internalize these stereotypes is not necessarily blameworthy; stereotypes are important organizing structures that provide the holders with a manageable way to view the world. 228 However, while the thought process itself should not be condemned, the courts should correct the legal inequity that exacerbates the process's negative result. It defeats the truth-finding function of the jury when defense attorneys can routinely tap into these pre-existing stereotypes without giving the victims the opportunities to provide the context that might level the playing field.
Absent this context, jurors' unfounded adoption of the stock stories will not only affect their perception of the victim's credibility, but will also play into the competing narrative that the defense will generally put forward in a long-term incest case. 22 9 That is, a defendant will, through cross-examination of prosecution witnesses or through defense witnesses, tell the jury a story as to why the victim should not be believed. 2 0 Where narratives compete in such a head-to-head way, jurors will look for the one that "rings true" in terms of their own 
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experiences. 231 If the child's narrative is truncated in such a way as to raise skepticism regarding the child's credibility, the competing narrative is that much more likely to be accepted.
C. THE ADVANTAGES DEFENDANTS HAVE OVER COMPLAINANTS IN
CREATING COMPETING NARRATIVES
A defendant in a case of long-term sexual abuse has advantages over a complainant in the construction of a competing narrative. First, a defendant has the advantage of simplicity. As much as a prosecutor will try to simplify a narrative of continuing incest, this kind of storyline is not subject to simplification. Even where a jury can view the entire pattern of abuse, jurors must still attend to dates and descriptions of sexual acts, remember who was present in the house for each act described, and scrutinize any threats of force or retaliation that a defendant might have made, either in the beginning or over time. In addition, jurors must attempt to understand and accept the underlying dynamic that would explain the defendant's acts, the victim's trauma and her subsequent responses.
A defendant putting forward a competing narrative need not make any attempt to refute the allegations on a date-by-date basis or attempt to explain his own psychology. He need only generally deny the allegations (through himself or his attorney), and either explicitly give or implicitly suggest to the jury a reason as to why the complainant would make a false allegation. 2 32 Since these reasons will generally capitalize on myth and stereotype, they have the advantage of simplicity:
233 The victim was a rebellious teenager trying to get back at a disciplinarian defendant; 234 she blamed defendant for acts she con-231 Pennington and Hastie found that jurors who heard competing narratives, or "both sides of the story," tended to be more confident in their decisions than jurors who heard only one side. Pennington & Hastie, The Story Model, supra note 189, at 543. Such "confidence" would seem to exacerbate any discomfort jurors might have with a truncated or partial narrative.
232 Again, the parallel to adult victims of acquaintance rape is apparent. See Coombs, supra note 82, at 282. In a system where the jury must decide between competing stories, the only viable way to proceed is to let each party put his or her narrative before the jury. However, in so doing, it becomes crucial to permit the victim to give the jury enough background into the charged offenses to illuminate the context within which the abuse occurred. Only at that point can jurors intelligently judge whether the narrative itself makes logical sense and whether the teller of the tale is credible. See CSAAS, supra note 11, at 186. 240 For an exploration as to how male defendants exploit weaknesses in the narratives of complainants in rape and sexual harrassment cases to further their own narratives of false accusation, see generally Scheppele, supra note 82.
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with the context exception to Molineux, the challenge lies in determining the limits of the incest storyline. How far back in time should a court go in determining that previous acts should be admitted as necessary context information? Emphasizing the need for a full narrative is inherently problematic because a story can begin and end anywhere that the teller deems appropriate. 24 1 Stories consist of events that take place among actors, which in turn give rise to new events. 242 In fact, narrative episodes can continue not only as the actors continue to interact, but even after they stop. 243 This lack of "natural" beginnings and "natural" endings 244 is particularly evident in attempting to determine the story of a crime committed within a family, where the parties act and react to each other years before and years after the actual "crime" occurs. Theoretically, a narrative of long-term sexual abuse could "begin" during defendant's childhood, well before the victim is even born, and these events could foreshadow defendant's later molestation of his own child. Yet, while such a narrative might be psychologically illuminating, 245 few would argue that it would or should be within the bounds of admissible evidence.
I suggest that we look back at the difficulty facing the incest complainant in presenting her narrative, to seek some limits as to the narrative's "beginning" and "end." That is, the unfairness of Harris and Singh is that the curtain rises on the victim's unexplained and inconceivable passivity: her cooperation with her assailant in particularly violative acts; her failure to prevent their reoccurrence; and her failure to disclose the acts to anyone. In determining what, if any, prior conduct the jury should learn of, a court should focus on conduct that will help the jury understand the array of forces that have caused this passivity. Drawing this line in the sand is also consistent with the context exception to the Molineux rule, which would deem prior conduct probative if it is necessary to explain the actions and reactions of the defendant 24 6 or the complaining witness. 247 Thus, before trial, upon motion of the prosecutor, the trial court should determine whether the complainant's description of the charged events would sound patently improbable without contextual explanation.
Once a court has made that determination and finds that the complainant's narrative requires further explanation, the Accommodation Syndrome is a paradigm that can effectively guide a trial judge seeking to determine the limits of admissibility of uncharged sexual acts. 248 The Accommodation Syndrome, at its most basic, illustrates that early acts of incest can cause a victim to become passive and accommodating, even to escalated levels of abuse. 24 9 The syndrome thus demonstrates how early events explain and give context to later events. Therefore, if, in a given case, the uncharged background demonstrates how the victim's otherwise unexplained passivity developed, ajudge should find that a contextual basis for admission of the accompanying acts exists.
2 50
Using the example of the Harris case, it would be appropriate for the judge to conclude, much as she did in this case, that Anna's passive acceptance of shocking sexual exploitation, along with her failure to outcry, require contextual explanation. She could next determine that Anna's responses were shaped by: (1) her young age at the time the abuse began; 251 (2) defendant's initial threats to secure her secrecy; 25 2 (3) his constant access, which permitted him to continue to abuse her; 253 (4) her accommodation, which permitted him to escalate the abuse; 25 4 (5) her mother's rebuff of Anna's one attempt at disclosure; 255 and (6) her mother's complete betrayal by becoming an 247 See People v. LeGrand, 431 N.Y.S.2d 850 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) . 248 For purposes of this article, I assume that the trial judge would be sufficiently knowledgeable about the Accommodation Syndrome to determine the admissibility of uncharged crimes in limine, without the need for expert testimony. However, the in limine nature of the determination does afford the trial court the opportunity to take expert testimony regarding the Accommodation Syndrome, compare the charged and uncharged crimes and reach a decision, if necessary.
249 See CSAAS supra note 11, at 184-85; see also Abuse of CSAAS, supra note 16, at 154-55. 250 The Accommodation Syndrome has been criticized by some who see it being misused as a diagnostic tool. Summit himself cautioned against prosecutors' use of the syndrome in court as proof that a child has been sexually abused, considering it invasive of the jury's function to determine the truth of the allegations. See Abuse of CSAAS, supra note 16, at 157-58. However, description of the accommodation pattern does rebut myths which might prejudice or preclude an understanding of a victim's accommodation, passivity and delayed or inconsistent disclosure. Id. at 160. In this respect, the Accommodation Syndrome is contextually important. Once a judge reached such a conclusion, the decision to admit the illustrative acts as necessary context logically follows. More generally, using this paradigm, a judge can consider whether the early acts might have shaped the charged crimes. Do they show how the perpetrator was able to secure his victim's secrecy? Were there enough of them to engender feelings of helplessness on the part of the victim? Do the acts demonstrate the child's increasing passivity? Did the child make any attempts at disclosure that were rebuffed? If the child subsequent to disclosure recanted, were there obvious pressures on her to do so? If any of these questions can be answered in the affirmative, the uncharged acts may be probative.
The courts' willingness to permit experts to testify in a limited fashion to the existence of Accommodation Syndrome 257 suggests not only that a growing understanding of the psychological components of child molestation is making its way into the courtroom, 2 5 but also that the syndrome's validity as a tool to develop a true incest narrative would be well-founded. Under the current practice in most jurisdictions, 25 9 experts are already permitted to testify regarding the syndrome much in the way suggested by Summit: not as a diagnosis of sexual abuse, but to disabuse jurors of myths they might hold as to how sexually abused children should act. 260 The expert may make no judgments regarding the child's allegations. Such judgments are the sole province of the jury.
61
If an expert can already testify about the Accommodation Syndrome, is testimony regarding uncharged crimes still necessary? Yes. First, an expert is much less likely to be called to testify where her testimony will seem to be at odds with the child complainant. If a child cannot testify regarding the origin and development of the 258 Earlier judicial interpretation of the statutory sex offenses considered each act of sexual abuse as a separate and discrete act, without connection. See People v. Keindl, 502 N.E.2d 577, 581-82 (N.Y. 1986); People v. Beauchamp, 532 N.E.2d 111, 114 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) .
259 The overwhelming majority ofjurisdictions will allow testimony based on the Accommodation Syndrome when it is used to explain the significance of the child complainant's seemingly self-impeaching behavior, such as delayed reporting or recantation. SeeAskowitz & Graham, supra note 18, at 2040 n.57.
260 See People v. Taylor, 552 N.E.2d 131, 136 (N.Y. 1990 [Vol. 87
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charged acts of sexual abuse, her truncated narrative is likely to conflict with that of the expert, who must explain the Accommodation pattern from the beginning. For example, an expert who would testify as to how accommodation develops over time would appear to be in conflict with Anna B., who, if restricted to the charged crimes, appears completely passive from the "beginning." In fact, in such a case, expert testimony would likely exacerbate doubts regarding the credibility of the adolescent complainant.
Second, the role of the expert is likely to be misunderstood by jurors, who would expect her to be offering information about the complainant in the case. This is exactly what the expert cannot do, since she cannot meet with the child or offer any opinion as to the allegations. The expert is therefore vulnerable to a defense narrative that again hurts the complainant: the hired gun who speaks without knowledge of "the facts." 262 Third, general information regarding the Accommodation Syndrome does not provide the specific context for the particular case at issue. If a narrative is an episodic set of actions and reactions among actors, an expert can only substitute hypothetical (albeit likely) possibilities for actual events. Such general testimony would thus seem more likely to invite speculation than it would to shed light on the charged acts.
Thus, the better practice would be to let the child victim provide the factual context for the charged abuse. Admitting the uncharged crimes for this purpose redresses the wrong done to the child, and may at the same time preempt the need for an expert to testify at all. 2 63 If the child can provide a clear context for the charged acts, a judge could well conclude that the jury does not need the assistance of an expert to determine the facts in issue. 2 64 In fact, in cases like LeGrand and Steinberg, the decision to admit prior uncharged bad acts appears to stem from just this kind ofjudicial approach. In those cases, the courts recognized that the witnesses 262 While little research has been conducted to determine the weightjurors give experts in cases of child sexual abuse, in the areas of battered woman syndrome and rape trauma syndrome, research does indicate that jurors are somewhat skeptical of experts. See Askowitz & Graham, supra note 18, at 2095-96. 263 The use of expert testimony has been sharply criticized because in some jurisdictions the Accommodation Syndrome or other "syndromes" are misrepresented as diagnostic of child sexual abuse in particular cases. See id. at 2044 See id. at -47, 2048 Current opinion is divided as to whether or not the public has become knowledgeable enough about child sexual abuse as to render expert testimony unnecessary. Id. at 2093-94. However, if the child is not sufficiently articulate to make the narrative comprehensible to jurors, an expert can assist in making the accommodation narrative understandable to them.
